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Abstract
It is common belief that semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties: no two possible worlds can
be non-semantic duplicates and fail to be semantic duplicates. The view enjoys somewhat of an orthodoxy status
in contemporary philosophy of language and metaphysics, and is often assumed without argument. Yet, work by
Stephen Kearns and Ofra Magidor has  claimed that  it  is  vulnerable to  a  variant  of  the classical  arguments
against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical.  This paper does three things: it clarifies what
semantic supervenience is about, it responds to the objections that have been leveled against it, and provides a
new battery of arguments in its favor. I argue that the thesis of semantic supervenience  is safe from classical
anti-supervenience arguments, and show that its rejection generates unwelcome consequences. I conclude that
there are substantial reasons to embrace the received wisdom: semantic properties supervene.
1. Introduction
There are  semantic  properties: the property of denoting H2O; the property of picking out a
stable referent across contexts of utterances; the property of being de se in the environment of
attitude verbs. And there are non-semantic properties: the property of having a single natural
satellite; the property of failing to react with oxygen at any temperature; the property of being
the former capital of West Germany.
What  is  the relationship  between semantic  and non-semantic  properties?  A popular
answer is the following: semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties. Call this,
for  brevity,  Semantic  Supervenience.  Semantic  Supervenience  enjoys  somewhat  of  an
orthodoxy status  in  contemporary  philosophy of  language  and metaphysics,  and  is  often
assumed without argument.1 Yet, the thesis has come under  scrutiny.  Kearns and Magidor
(2012) (henceforth, K&M) have argued that  the consensus is vulnerable to a variant of the
classical arguments against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, and that the
success of these arguments should lead us to abandon Semantic Supervenience. Were such a
diagnosis correct, it would have major implications on the way we’ve grown accustomed to
1 Example: “Where do semantic properties come from? The presupposition of this question is that the fact that a
word (or a sentence, or whatever) means what it does can’t be a brute fact. It can’t be a brute fact, for example,
that ‘dog’ means dog and not proton and that ‘proton’ means proton and not dog. Rather, ‘dog’ must have some
non-semantic property in virtue of which it means dog and not proton; and ‘proton’ must have some (different)
non-semantic property in virtue of which it means proton and not dog. To put it in the standard philosophical
jargon, semantic properties must supervene on non-semantic properties” (Fodor and Lepore 1991: 328).
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thinking about semantic phenomena: it would disqualify from the get-go the quest for any
stronger  metaphysical  relation  between  non-semantic  facts  and  semantic  facts  (be  it
entailment, grounding, ontological dependence, or what have you), and would quite possibly
force us to renegotiate a sizable amount of classical work on meaning and content.2
The task of this paper is threefold. The first is to formulate Semantic Supervenience
and lay out the requirements for a meaningful  assessment of the thesis.  The second is to
respond to the objections that have been leveled against it by K&M. The third is to provide a
new battery of arguments in its favor. The take-home message will be the following: though
often  assumed without argument,  there  are  substantial  reasons  to  embrace the  received
wisdom. Semantic properties supervene on non-semantic properties.3
The plan is as follows. Section 2 defines Semantic Supervenience. Section 3 presents
K&M’s anti-supervenience argument.  Section 4 argues that K&M’s  case doesn’t hold up.
Section 5 presents three counterarguments for Semantic Supervenience. Section 6 concludes.
2. Semantic Supervenience
First things first: let’s get clear about what Semantic Supervenience  amounts to, and about
the assumptions we need to grant to warrant a meaningful discussion of the thesis.
To  start,  I  will  grant  that  semantic  properties  exist,  that  semantic  properties  are
knowable, and that we should be safeguarded from the threat of a massive error theory about
semantic properties. These assumptions seem essential to a charitable assessment of Semantic
Supervenience. If semantic properties didn’t exist, the question whether they supervene on
non-semantic  properties  would be moot.  If semantic  properties  were not knowable,  if  we
were at risk of being catastrophically mistaken about them, or if we were bound to be merely
2 E.g., standard metasemantic externalism: if semantic properties aren’t guaranteed to hold constant across pairs
of non-semantically duplicate worlds, we should probably be ready to accept particle-by-particle nomological
replicas of the actual world where ‘water’ refers to liquid metal, Easter eggs, or doesn’t refer at all.
3 I’m not the first to raise concerns about K&M’s argument. Child (2019) has proposed a detailed evaluation of
K&M’s case.  Though some of my reservations have ended up overlapping with those expressed by Child, my
argument should nonetheless  bear independent interest. First, Child does not address K&M’s argument from
haecceitistic properties (see Section 3); this paper does. Second, my assessment of K&M’s argument pursues, at
various junctures, a response strategy different from the one favored by Child. Third, Child restricts himself to
responding to K&M’s anti-supervenience case; this paper adds a battery of positive considerations for Semantic
Supervenience. This paper therefore offers a complete and independent response to K&M’s challenge, as well
as a new positive case for Semantic Supervenience. The loci of convergence with Child’s commentary will be
pointed out in due course. For  concision’s sake,  and because that would make the argument tedious, I won’t
delve into the components of Child’s response about which I would in turn be skeptical. I leave a more in-depth
comparison to the interested reader.
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luckily correct about them, we wouldn’t be in a position to make reliable judgments about the
semantic properties instantiated at any given world, and it would be hard to determine with
reasonable confidence whether the predictions of Semantic Supervenience hold up.4
I will not draw any precise (and necessarily contentious) boundary between the domain
of semantic properties and the domain of non-semantic properties, both inside and outside
language.  For example,  I  won’t ponder whether  properties like  animacy,  aktionsart  or S-
selection,  which textbook linguistics  would take to  sit  on the border between syntax and
semantics, should be included in the pool of properties the supervenience thesis characterizes
as supervenient. I will take it that as long as we can identify central instances of semantic
properties (e.g., the property of being referentially empty, the property of being true in French
iff it is snowing in Paris), the prospects of Semantic Supervenience can be fruitfully assessed
by reflecting on how well it fares with respect to such central instances, with no need to carve
out the exact extension of the two relata.
Following established practice,  I will  take Semantic  Supervenience to be concerned
with both  internal semantic properties and  intentional semantic properties. The distinction
can be glossed as follows. The property of being true in French iff it is snowing in Paris, is an
internal semantic property of  “Il neige à Paris”, since it depends solely on the rules of the
language. By contrast, the property of being referentially empty is an intentional semantic
property of the noun phrase “a magical winged horse”, since it is determined by the way
things stand outside  the  language.  Similarly,  being conservative is an  internal property of
natural language determiners (e.g., Keenan and Stavi 1986). By contrast, being about her dog
Poe is an intentional semantic property of Jill’s visual experience of Poe, which would fail to
be instantiated at a world where an evil demon has replaced Poe with a robot replica of Poe.
I’m making this explicit because talk of “intentional semantic properties”  might be hard to
swallow for some deflationists, as well as for Chomskyian views on which the domain of the
semantic encompasses only algebraic-compositional roles and has nothing to do with world-
involving  properties like  reference  and truth  (e.g.,  McGilvray  1998;  Segal  2000;  Collins
2009; Pietroski 2018). Though I expect my argument to hold even if deflationism or (radical)
4 For anti-realism about semantic properties, see, e.g., Horgan and Timmons (1993). Note that in assuming that
we should be safeguarded  from the threat  of a  massive error  theory about semantic properties,  I’m simply
setting  the  requirement  that  we  should  have  some reliable  means  (introspective,  empirical,  theoretical)  of
tracking  semantic  properties.  That  would  be  compatible  with  the  “elitist”  view that  only  mature  semantic
theories can reliably track semantic properties, that speakers’  native judgments about semantic properties may
contain regions of error, or that some semantic properties may systematically lack transparency for ordinary
speakers. See, e.g., Hodgson (2020) on the structure of content. 
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internalism proved correct, I will abide by the opposite consensus and allow the domain of
the semantic to encompass intentional properties.
What  about  non-semantic  properties?  I  will  simply  understand  the  category  to
encompass  every property  of  a  world  which  is  not  semantic  in  nature,  without  further
qualification. Notice that,  so defined, the subvening base of “non-semantic properties” isn’t
restricted to facts about language use or to the physical properties  of a  world.  So,  e.g., a
possible world  where at the time of writing this sentence there’s an invisible ectoplasmic
object right next to my laptop, would  bear a non-semantic  property that the actual  world
lacks, even if the property in question isn’t physical and has nothing to do with “use facts”
under any well-established interpretation of the expression.5 The reason for this all-inclusive
approach  to  the  extension  of  the  subvening  base  is  that  Semantic  Supervenience  isn’t
supposed to be a vindication of  a use-oriented theory of meaning, nor to hold on condition
that the actual world is a physicalist world, nor to be viable as long as non-physical properties
are impossible. The business of the thesis is to teach us a principled lesson about the nature of
the  semantic that  holds  irrespective  of  whether  the  we believe  that  meaning  is  (wholly)
determined by use, and irrespective of the truth of physicalism.6
Next, we need to say something about the nature of the supervenience relation at work
in Semantic Supervenience. This is an indispensable preliminary, since supervenience claims
5 Nota bene:  at  the beginning of their piece,  K&M  announce that  they will  inquire into whether  semantic
properties supervene on “use facts”. Their terminology is a bit confusing, since under K&M’s construal, which
they clarify later on in the paper, the label doesn’t pick out what I would expect most philosophers to mean by
“use facts” (e.g., distribution patterns of expression tokens in linguistic behavior); instead, it’s employed as an
umbrella  term  for  non-semantic  properties  as  I’m  describing  them  here.  I  therefore  drop the  potentially
misleading label, but the substance of the setup parallels K&M. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing
me to be explicit about this.
6 On physicalism, see again Fodor and Lepore (1991: 329): “[N]one of this is to be construed as an attempt to
legislate  physicalism.  For  present  purposes  we’re  content  that  semantic  properties  should be,  for  example,
irreducibly intentional, or irreducibly epistemological, or irreducibly teleological. But we take it to be not on the
cards  that  they are  irreducibly semantic.  In  short,  we don’t  care  whether  semantic  properties  supervene on
something that is physical just as long as they supervene on something other than themselves.”  Besides, it is
fairly  easy to produce a working argument against the  physical  supervenience of the semantic: just take your
favorite  anti-physicalist  argument,  work  it  into  a  scenario  featuring  an  utterance  about  a  non-supervenient
property, and draw the consequences. Example, inspired by Thomas (1998). Suppose I listen to a song and say:
“This makes me feel so good!”. Everyone would assume that my utterance is true, since it characterizes an
experience I’m having. Now suppose my zombie twin produces the same utterance. He too seems to be talking
about an experience. But his utterance cannot be true; he’s a zombie. It would then seem that the utterance of
my zombie twin differs semantically from  my utterance even if  we’re physically indiscernible.  Conclusion:
semantic properties don’t supervene on physical properties.
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lend  themselves  to  a  number  of  different  construals,  and  the  tenability  of Semantic
Supervenience is going to  hinge upon what specific kind of supervenience relation  we take
the principle to ask us to buy into. I will take Semantic Supervenience, as K&M do, to pursue
a claim of  strong-global supervenience (see, a.o., McLaughlin 1995; Stalnaker 1996; Fine
2002; Leuenberger 2008). Accordingly, I will take Semantic Supervenience to consist of the
claim that for any two possible worlds  w1 and  w2, if  w1 and  w2 have the same worldwide
distribution of non-semantic properties, then w1 and w2 have the same worldwide distribution
of semantic properties.
In  selecting this  construal,  I’m  excluding  from  the  theoretical  landscape  local
supervenience (i.e., the thesis that the semantic properties of individual objects supervene on
the non-semantic properties instantiated by those objects), single-domain supervenience (i.e.,
the thesis that  the semantic properties of individual classes of things supervene on the non-
semantic  properties  instantiated  by  those  classes  of  things),  and  multiple-domain
supervenience (i.e., the thesis that the semantic properties associated to individual classes of
things supervene on the non-semantic properties instantiated by other classes of things). As
K&M note,  local  and single-domain supervenience  would require  us to  take a  principled
stand  against  the externalist intuition  that  the  semantic  properties  of  non-semantically
indiscernible utterances can be fixed by  worldly  features like the chemical composition of
substances. Multiple-domain supervenience would prevent semantic properties from having
in their subvening base the non-semantic properties of the entities that instantiate them.7 The
formulation also sets aside  weak-global supervenience,  on  which Semantic  Supervenience
would claim that for any two possible worlds w1 and w2, if there is an isomorphism between
w1 and  w2 that preserves non-semantic properties, there also is an isomorphism between w1
and w2 that preserves semantic properties. Why? Suppose W@ is the actual world,8 and that in
W@ the meaning of ‘iron’ is fixed by a set of non-semantic properties N (e.g., the atomic
structure of iron, the laws of W@, and so forth). Suppose WIron is a possible world which
instantiates  N,  and  diverges  from  W@ otherwise.  Weak-global  supervenience  doesn’t
guarantee that ‘iron’ will instantiate the same semantic properties across W@ and WIron; it just
guarantees that as a result of the duplication of N there will be some semantic isomorphism
between W@ and WIron. Strong-global supervenience avoids this implication.
The  final  clarification  concerns  the  epistemic  access  to  metaphysical  possibility.
Semantic Supervenience deals with possible worlds: how do we tell whether or not a world is
7 Which seems to be a regular occurrence: think about the morphosyntactic class of an expression, about the
observable spatial configuration of a pro-speech gesture, or about the phonological form of an iconic verb. For
more on this, see Gasparri (to appear).
8 From here on, ‘W@’ will designate the actual world.
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possible? Whether whatever  is  conceivable is also possible, and whether conceivability is a
reliable guide to possibility, are thorny issues that go well beyond the scope of this paper.
Some argue in favor (e.g., Levine 2001; Stoljar 2001), but there certainly is no shortage of
philosophers  arguing  that  conceivability  is  incapable  of  providing  a  dependable  test  for
claims of metaphysical possibility (a.o., Yablo 1993; Hill 1997; Balog 1999; Frankish 2007).
For present purposes, and again in keeping with K&M, I will grant conceivability as a test for
possibility.  Accordingly,  I  will  grant  that  proof  that  the  interplay  of  semantic  and  non-
semantic properties can conceivably behave in a way that is inconsistent with the suggested
formulation of Semantic Supervenience, would falsify the principle. This is granting a lot, of
course, but the concession isn’t uncommon in  the recent  literature on supervenience,9 and
stands to benefit both parties to the debate. The opponent of Semantic Supervenience can
enjoy the convenience of a relaxed epistemic bar for claims of metaphysical possibility, and
attack the principle with minimal restrictions on the range of possibilia she can wield against
the consensus. The advocate of Semantic Supervenience can, in turn, brandish the concession
against its adversary in case of failure to deliver a clear argument against the consensus: if
even under such a generous epistemic bar for claims of possibility we cannot produce a fair
counterexample to the principle, perhaps we really have no reason to refrain from accepting
Semantic Supervenience.
3. Semantic Ghosts, Magic, Haecceitistic Twins
We have defined Semantic Supervenience as the  claim that no two possible (conceivable)
worlds w1 and w2 can instantiate the same worldwide distribution of non-semantic properties,
and fail to feature the same worldwide distribution of semantic properties. Or, conversely, as
the  claim that  no  two  possible  (conceivable)  worlds  w1 and  w2 can  instantiate  different
worldwide  distributions  of  semantic  properties  while  featuring the  same  worldwide
distribution of non-semantic properties.
Semantic Supervenience appears to deliver the goods. Suppose W@ doesn’t feature  a
substance composed purely of neutrons.  Suppose,  further,  that WNeutrium is  a non-semantic
duplicate of W@ which differs from W@ exclusively in this: in WNeutrium, the phrase “substance
composed purely of neutrons” is not referentially empty. Semantic Supervenience predicts
that WNeutrium cannot conceivably be a non-semantic duplicate of W@, and it’s easy to see why
this is the correct conclusion. In order for “substance composed purely of neutrons” to be
referentially  non-empty  at  a  world  w,  w should  feature  a  substance  composed purely  of
neutrons.  However,  no  two  worlds  respectively  featuring  and  not  featuring  a  substance
9 E.g., see Hattiangadi’s (2018) conceivability argument against moral supervenience.
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composed purely of neutrons can instantiate the same worldwide distribution of non-semantic
properties. So WNeutrium cannot conceivably be a non-semantic duplicate of W@.
Semantic  Supervenience  is  also  immune  to  simple  scenarios  appealing  to  inverted
semantic properties. Suppose WColor is a duplicate of W@ differing from W@ solely for fact
that, in WColor, ‘blue’ means red, and ‘red’ means blue. Suppose, further, that W@ and WColor
both feature  Rebecca. Actual  Rebecca and her counterpart  in WColor know the meaning of
‘red’ and ‘blue’ in their respective worlds. Rebecca is presented with a blue mug, and asked
to write  down on a  piece of paper  the color  of the mug  she’s been presented with.  The
inscription produced by actual Rebecca will concatenate the letters <b>, <l>, <u>, and <e>.
The inscription produced by “inverted”  Rebecca will concatenate the letters <r>, <e>, and
<d>. Differences in the distribution of letter tokens on writing supports are non-semantic, or
at least have a non-semantic component. W@ and WColor will differ physically, relative to the
arrangement of the marks of ink left by Rebecca on the piece of paper. And they will differ
behaviorally,  relative  to  the  manual  movements  Rebecca will  execute  in  producing  the
inscription.  No  two  worlds  can  differ  in  physical  and  behavioral  properties  while  also
instantiating  the  same  distribution  of  non-semantic  properties.  Hence,  WColor cannot
conceivably be a non-semantic duplicate of W@.10
So  far,  so  good.  But  these  are  admittedly  entry-level  case  studies,  and  nothing
guarantees  that  Semantic  Supervenience  will  hold  ground  against  more  sophisticated
challenges.  As was mentioned,  K&M maintain  that  such sophisticated  challenges  can be
formulated, and that the resulting arguments, inspired by the classical literature against the
supervenience  of  the  phenomenal  on  the  physical,  provide  exactly  the  kind  of  defeating
conceptual evidence that should lead us to abandon Semantic Supervenience.11
K&M’s case  against Semantic  Supervenience combines what we might call a “core”
component and an “instrumental” component. The “core” component is the description of
three thought experiments aimed at demonstrating that pairs of worlds can conceivably bear
the  same  distribution  of  non-semantic  properties  while  failing  to  instantiate  the  same
distribution  of  semantic  properties.  The  “instrumental”  component  is  the  claim  that  the
retraction of Semantic Supervenience paves the way for promising new solutions to a series
10 This is already a telling case, as it suggests that unlike classical phenomenal inversion, where differences in
qualia  structure  are  conceivably  consistent  with  physical  and  behavioral  indiscernibility  (Shoemaker  1982;
Block 1990), the inversion of semantic properties seems to carry along non-semantic discernibility.
11 Zhong (2017) makes a similar move against semantic normativism. He argues that semantic normativism has
difficulties accommodating  the causal  efficacy  of  semantic  properties,  and  raises an exclusion problem  for
semantic norms inspired by the exclusion problem in the philosophy of mind. It’d be nice to delve into Zhong’s
argument, but I’m going to have to leave normativism for another occasion.
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of open issues in the philosophy of language (most notably, the semantics of vagueness and
arbitrary reference), approaches that weren’t viable under the supervenience thesis.
In what follows, I will focus exclusively on the core component of K&M’s argument.
Besides for the usual suspect (i.e.,  constraints of space), the restriction of scope rests on the
following consideration:  even  if  the explanatory  purchase  offered  by  the  rejection  of
Semantic  Supervenience  were a  good reason for  liking  the  proposal,  the  stability  of  the
picture of semantic properties that informs the instrumental argument  is conditional on the
absence of a response to the core argument. This is not to say that one should necessarily first
establish  the  core  argument,  and  only  then  look  into  the  epistemic  benefits  of  dropping
Semantic Supervenience, as if the latter were, dialectically speaking, accessory or immaterial
to  the  former.  Quite  the  opposite:  it  makes  complete  sense  to  regard  the  explanatory
advantages  potentially  offered  by  giving  up  supervenience  as  a  reason  for  considering
whether the move stands to scrutiny. However,  first, inferences from explanatory gains to
matters of metaphysical substance are a delicate matter; there are multiple domains in which
we refrain from making them, and semantic properties might fall in that category.12 Second,
even if dropping supervenience did lead to explanatory gains in the analysis of vagueness and
arbitrary reference  (let’s grant that for the sake of argument),  such gains would  warrant an
inference  to  the  best  explanation  against  supervenience on  condition  that  the  shift  in
paradigm  is not defeated by  rival metaphysical considerations. Otherwise, the advocate of
Semantic  Supervenience  seems entitled  to  remain unimpressed.  Thinking  about  semantic
properties  as if  they  were non-supervenient may as well simplify our analysis of meaning.
But if the heuristic picture of semantic properties  fueling the move is unstable (because the
core  arguments  in  its  favor  are  not  conclusive)  or  vulnerable  to non-instrumental
counterarguments  against  its  metaphysical  viability  (as I’ll  try to  show),  the prospects of
letting it inform one’s account of what semantic properties  are – the subject matter of the
present debate – are likely to lose much of their initial attraction.13
12 Here’s a crude analogy to make the point vivid. Thinking of human subjects as idealized rational agents has
allowed decision theory to produce generalizations about agentive behavior that we wouldn’t have been able to
produce otherwise. At the same time, we have substantial overriding arguments to refrain from taking the notion
of an idealized rational agent to settle the nature of actual agents: we accept the explanatory purchase afforded
by the notion  and believe that actual agents are something else entirely.  Mutatis mutandis, suppose  thinking
about  semantic  properties  as  non-supervenient  gives us  new insights  into  the  workings  of  vagueness  and
arbitrary  reference.  This doesn’t  mean that  we should  ipso facto rely on those instrumental gains  to  draw
metaphysical  conclusions  about  the  nature  of  meaning,  especially  if  we  can  provide  non-instrumental
considerations against making that inference. On idealization and explanation, see, e.g, Potochnik (2017).
13 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for discussion on this juncture.
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With this mind, we can now turn to the three “core” thought experiments described by
K&M. For  concision’s  sake,  I  will  label  them as  follows:  Semantic  Ghosts,  Magic,  and
Haecceitistic Twins.14
First, Semantic Ghosts. Suppose WGhosts is a duplicate of W@ which in addition contains
some non-physical ghosts. Suppose, further, that the ghosts of WGhosts are purely semantic
entities  which  bear  semantic  properties  but  lack  non-semantic  properties.  Were  purely
semantic  ghosts  conceivable,  there  would  be  a  conceivable  duplicate  of  W@ which
instantiates the same worldwide distribution of non-semantic properties as W@, and yet fails
to instantiate the same worldwide distribution of semantic properties. Purely semantic ghosts,
the argument continues, are conceivable. So Semantic Supervenience stands refuted.
Next, Magic. Suppose WOrdinary is a duplicate of W@ where nobody has uttered and will
ever utter the expression ‘abra’. Suppose, further, that WMagic is a duplicate of WOrdinary which
differs from WOrdinary only in the fact that in WMagic the expression ‘abra’ has magical powers:
if anyone were to utter it, they would cast a spell and turn rocks into unicorns. The magical
powers  instantiated  by  ‘abra’  in  WMagic,  K&M  argue,  are  plausibly  part  of  its  semantic
properties. Compare with the illocutionary properties of expressions like the verb ‘promise’.
Filing the magical  powers of ‘abra’ under the rubric of its  semantic  properties  seems an
innocent extension of the idea that it is part of the semantic properties of ‘promise’ that, by
uttering it as part of an appropriate speech act, one can “speak into existence” the social and
practical  commitments  we  associate  to  the  act  of  promising.  Furthermore,  regardless  of
whether  you are  inclined  to  regard  the  specific  power  of  turning rocks  into  unicorns  as
something that can reasonably be filed under the rubric of semantic properties, ‘abra’ is a
semantic  entity,  and  differences  in  the  properties  of  semantic  entities  are  semantic
differences.  Why should we think  of  ‘abra’  as  a  semantic  entity?  Because,  K&M  argue,
‘abra’  could be uttered, and only semantic entities can be uttered. One can  “articulate” or
“produce” speech sounds without “uttering” any semantic entity, and do so even if sequence
of speech sounds in question matches the phonological form of an actual expression type.15
14 The labels are mine, but what follows is a charitable summary (with some minor adjustments) of the cases.
Note that  the scenarios  I’m about to describe are all introduced in  Section 3 of K&M’s paper,  where they
discuss, as I’m doing, the thesis of the supervenience of the semantic on the non-semantic, whereas Sections 1
and 2 of their article  target the supervenience of the semantic on the physical. As was  mentioned, Semantic
Supervenience wouldn’t be moved by proof that the semantic can conceivably fail to supervene on the physical.
Also, recall fn. 6 on the “easy argument” from anti-physicalism.
15 Example:  a  subject  instructed by a speech  scientist  to  pronounce  without  pauses  first  the first  letter  of
‘curious’,  then the fourth letter  of  ‘uncanny’,  and finally  the second letter  of  ‘atone’,  and engaging  in the
articulation exercise with the only intention of following the directions of the scientist, might  “produce” the
9
However, genuine acts of utterance can performed exclusively with semantic entities as their
object. These combined considerations make a plausible case that WMagic duplicates WOrdinary
non-semantically  but  is  semantically  discernible  from  WOrdinary.  And  since  WMagic is
conceivable, Semantic Supervenience is false.
Finally,  Haecceitistic Twins. Suppose WTwin is a non-semantic duplicate of W@ which
instead  of  Jack  contains  a  doppelgänger  of  Jack:  Twin  Jack.  Jack  and  Twin  Jack  are
indiscernible  but  haecceitistically  distinct.  Suppose,  furthermore,  that  reference  is
individuated by haecceitistic properties. Accordingly, that because ‘Jack’ picks out Jack in
W@,  and Twin Jack in WTwin, the reference of ‘Jack’ in W@  differs from the reference of
‘Jack’  in  WTwin.  Now,  any  standard  construal  of  the  thesis  of  the  supervenience  of  the
semantic on the non-semantic, K&M observe, would take it that haecceitistic properties fall
outside the base of subvening properties that determine semantic properties. Because of that,
W@ and WTwin can safely be considered non-semantic  duplicates,  despite the haecceitistic
difference  between Jack and Twin Jack.  However,  utterances  of ‘Jack’  in  W@ and WTwin
remain semantically discernible, since they pick out two haecceitistically distinct individuals.
W@ and WTwin are therefore non-semantic duplicates that instantiate a different  worldwide
distribution of semantic properties. Once again, Semantic Supervenience stands refuted.
4. Neutralizing the Core Argument
K&M argue that Semantic Ghosts, Magic, and Haecceitistic Twins produce each a successful
counterexample to Semantic Supervenience, and lend each substantial support to the notion
that semantic properties need not supervene on the non-semantic. In this Section, I argue that
these three thought experiments don’t hold up.
Let us start with Semantic Ghosts. The cornerstone of this scenario is the conceivability
of  a  world duplicating  the worldwide  distribution  of  non-semantic  properties  of  W@ and
featuring, in addition, “purely semantic ghosts”. What kind of entity is a “purely semantic
ghost”  supposed to  be?  Suppose  we  think  of  it as  an  incorporeal aggregate of  semantic
properties  able to subsist as a singular entity: a purely intentional Cartesian soul  made up
exclusively of semantic  properties  and without  any non-semantic  attribute.16 Accordingly,
suppose we construe WGhosts as a duplicate of W@ which differs from the actual world solely
in the fact that WGhosts features an intentional ghost G, which is absent in W@.
sound segments corresponding to the word ‘cat’ without necessarily “uttering” the word ‘cat’.
16 Nothing  crucial  hinges  on  this,  as  the  considerations  about  to follow would  readily  apply  to  different
construals of what “semantic ghosts” are supposed to amount to. Say, clusters of semantic properties instantiated
on some ectoplasmic substratum, or phantom clusters of intentional properties attached to an ordinary object.
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At this point, WGhosts  and W@ seem indeed separated by a semantic difference while
remaining perfect non-semantic duplicates, pace Semantic Supervenience. Consider however
the following question:  how comes that WGhosts features G, whereas W@ doesn’t? Logical
space can be partitioned into two classes of responses: either the semantic difference between
WGhosts and W@ has some non-semantic ground; or the semantic difference between WGhosts
and W@ has no non-semantic ground. Suppose the semantic difference between WGhosts and
W@ does have  some non-semantic  ground. In such a case,  there would have to be some
difference in non-semantic facts which causes the instantiation of G to occur in WGhosts, and to
fail to occur in W@. If so, WGhosts and W@ couldn’t conceivably bear the same distribution of
non-semantic  properties,  and  the  comparison  would  no  longer  threaten  Semantic
Supervenience. Suppose instead the semantic difference between WGhosts and W@ has no non-
semantic ground: in WGhosts, G is  brutely instantiated. If belief  in the brute instantiation of
semantic properties is what Semantic Ghosts needs us to buy into to warrant skepticism about
Semantic Supervenience, two worries arise. First, the actual conceivability of the case is up
for grabs: the verdict of conceivability fueling the argument is a bit nonchalant and might not
stand  to  closer  scrutiny.  Second,  and  more  importantly,  the  attack  looks dangerously
conditional on what it should prove.
Compare with the following. Suppose WSink is a duplicate of W@ where my kitchen sink
instantiates the property of being in a state of perpetual bliss; the notion that phenomenal
properties may be instantiated brutely does not suffer from obvious contradictions; so WSink is
conceivable; but then, WSink is possible; hence, physicalism is false. The physicalist is likely
to reply, with good reason, that this is not a fair attack to her position. Leaving aside the
multiple red flags one might want to raise about moving so quickly from conceivability to
possibility, which we’ve decided to grant, it is far from clear that blissfulness can conceivably
be brutely instantiated by perfect non-phenomenal duplicates of actual kitchen sinks. The
verbal description of the scenario doesn’t suffer from obvious contradictions,  of course, but
the resulting impression of conceivability  might  be completely  prima facie,  in Chalmers’
(2002) sense.17
Secondly, appeals to the brute instantiation of phenomenal properties are usable (read:
eligible to pull any reliable argumentative weight) only modulo an agreement that one can
spot  cracks  in  the  physicalist  thesis  without  making  self-fulfilling  anti-physicalist
assumptions,  not  within a master argument against physicalism. We can certainly rely on
17 I’ll leave it as that for the time being, but we’ll return to issues of conceivability in Section 5, where I’ll
argue that at least one prominent conceivability argument against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the
physical, cannot be refashioned into a conceivability argument against Semantic Supervenience.
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Cartesian intuitions to concoct imaginings about worlds haunted by blissful sinks, talking
angels, disembodied experiencings, and space-time regions magically instantiating semantic
properties. But it would be unfair to take them – and, to the best of my knowledge, no one de
facto takes  them  –  as  evidence  of  the  falsity  of  physicalism.  I  believe  the  advocate  of
Semantic Supervenience is entitled to a similar reply if pressed with the comparison between
W@ and WGhosts. It is controversial to evaluate Semantic Supervenience on the basis of the
premise  that  it  is  metaphysically  possible  that  semantic  facts  vary  brutely  across  non-
semantically duplicate worlds, since the premise that semantic facts may vary brutely across
non-semantically  duplicate  worlds  presupposes  a  stance  on  the  relationship  between  the
semantic and the non-semantic which is inconsistent from the get-go with the ideology of
Semantic Supervenience. Bottom line: Semantic Ghosts is at best conditional on a precarious
judgment of conceivability, and at worst question-begging.18
Let us now turn to Magic. There are three main components to this counterexample: i)
the claim that ‘abra’ is a semantic entity because it can be uttered, and only semantic entities
can be uttered; ii) the claim that the magical properties instantiated by ‘abra’ in WMagic are part
of its illocutionary properties; and iii) the claim that differences in illocutionary properties
among semantic  entities  have  to  be classified  as  semantic  differences.  K&M’s  argument
requires the conjunction of these three assumptions to have a clear shot at the claim that the
difference between WMagic and the actual world is purely semantic.19
Yet,  I  believe  that  each  of  these  claims  can  be  resisted.  First,  the  claim that  only
semantic  entities  can  be  uttered  may  have  simple  counterexamples.  Suppose  a  group of
speakers  with  a  taste  for  phonological  stunts  decides  to  play  a  game which  runs  on  the
following two steps. At each turn, a player has to invent a meaningless jabberwocky sentence
which complies with the phonotactic constraints of English, and write it on a card. The card is
then shown to the other participants, who have to memorize the sentence, wait 30 seconds in
silence, and then pronounce it out loud.  Player #1 starts, creates the sentence “Pip frew a
18 Child (2019: 224) would seem to concur: “[K&M] are not really offering an argument […]; they are in effect
simply asserting that the supervenience claim is false.”
19 Which might as well be attacked on independent grounds, as Child (2019) does. Paraphrasing a bit, his point
in this case is the following. Even if the property of turning turning rocks into unicorns were definitional of the
semantic properties of magical ‘abra’, and did establish a semantic difference  from its actual counterpart, one
would  still  need  the  appropriate  set  of  nomological  or  dispositional  facts  in  place  to  make  its  utterance
efficacious, which in turn would threaten the requirement of full non-semantic indiscernibility needed to attack
the supervenience thesis. My response to K&M pursues another strategy: I object on their own grounds to the
initial assumption that the power of turning turning rocks into unicorns may plausibly be taken to be definitional
of the semantic properties of magical ‘abra’.
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meebot”,  and the game proceeds as described. It seems perfectly  possible to describe the
situation as one involving the utterance of a newly coined sentence designed to lack semantic
properties,  at  least absent a clear argument  that the scope  of application of the notion of
“utterance” should be restricted to the articulation of entities with semantic properties. None
such argument is provided by K&M, who rest content with pointing out that “saying of a
non-semantic object that it is uttered results in a kind of category mistake” (p. 341).  Yet,
statements like “The participants uttered the sentence ‘Pip frew a meebot’”  or “Sue uttered
her favorite meaningless word” wouldn’t seem to suffer from obvious deficiencies in felicity,
unlike paradigm examples of category mistakes like “# John poured his apartment”. So this
component of the counterexample is unclear.20
Similar comments apply to the claim that the magical powers instantiated by ‘abra’ in
WMagic should be filed among the illocutionary properties of the expression. Turning rocks into
unicorns  is  a  causal power,  not  semantic  one,  as  is  attested  by  the  fact  that  we  can
conceivably  ascribe  it  to  utterances  of  any given expression  while  remaining  completely
agnostic about its semantic properties. There’s nothing in particular ‘abra’ should mean to be
conceivably  invested  with  the  power  of  turning  rocks  into  unicorns:  the  word  could  be
nonsensical, denote something completely unrelated to its function (say, pick out the third
largest  crater  on  Mars),  have  no  semantic  properties  whatsoever,  and  still  do  its  magic.
Moreover,  going  back  to  the  proposed  analogy  with  ‘promise’,  paradigm  instances  of
illocutionary force concern cases where the extra-linguistic effects stemming from the use of
an expression in the appropriate contexts, can be the result of convention building among
speakers.  If,  for some bizarre  lexical  cataclysm,  the verb ‘promise’  disappeared from the
English  language,  speakers  of  English  could  baptize  a  novel  expression  (say,  ‘flomise’)
designed to play the same set of linguistic and social functions. The newly invented word
would then be invested with the illocutionary force that ‘promise’ used to have when it was in
circulation, and could be used to make promises. By contrast, it is unclear how the magical
powers of a word like ‘abra’ could ever be result of convention building among a group of
ordinary speakers.
20 Is this just trading intuitions? To some extent it is, but not for the purpose of asserting the superiority of the
intuitions  of  who’s  writing,  which  would  be  spectacularly  unhelpful.  The  point  is  to  make  clear  that  the
restriction of “utterability” to objects with semantic properties cannot be justified on pre-theoretical grounds
(since the underlying intuition is not robust), and that the first-pass acceptability of statements like the ones I’ve
provided pushes in the opposite direction. In other words, the restriction requires argument, and since there’s
prima facie evidence against it,  wielding it without further  qualification against Semantic Supervenience is,
dialectically speaking, less than ideal.
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Finally,  differences  in  illocutionary  properties  may  not  have  to correlate  with
differences in semantic properties. The intuition is the following: any meaningful expression
of our language can be brought to bear whatever  illocutionary force a group of speakers
wants it to bear without ipso facto intervening on its semantic properties. Suppose a group of
speakers with a sensational fascination for marine invertebrates establishes a Society for the
Appreciation  of  Octopuses.  The  speakers  convene  that  at  the  formal  meetings  of  the
association, a special rule is in force: uttering the word ‘octopus’ in front of the Society’s
disciplinary panel guarantees that the speaker’s testimony is going to be completely sincere
and truthful. The example seems to involve the combination of illocutionary variation and
semantic  indiscernibility  K&M wish to rule out:  within the collective  proceedings  of the
Society,  the word ‘octopus’ has come to instantiate  a new illocutionary function,  but the
change does not correlate with any variation in semantic properties like intension, extension,
reference,  grammatical  class,  or semantic  type.  Absent,  again,  a specific  argument  to the
contrary,  it  seems  possible to  conclude  that  illocutionary  differences  may  indeed  exist
between pairs of semantically indiscernible expressions.
Having addressed Magic, the last thought experiment in K&M’s lineup is Haecceitistic
Twins. Recall the main features of the case. WTwin is a duplicate of the actual world differing
from W@  solely  for  the fact  that,  in  WTwin,  Jack is  replaced by Twin Jack,  an individual
qualitatively  indiscernible  but  haecceitistically  distinct  from Jack.  Because  differences  in
haecceitistic properties fall outside the realm of non-semantic factors that are usually taken to
determine semantic properties, K&M argue, W@ and WTwin can safely be considered non-
semantic  duplicates.  However,  expressions  referring  to  haecceitistically  distinct
indiscernibles are semantically discernible: the name ‘Jack’ denotes Jack in W@, and Twin
Jack in WTwin. As a result, the name ‘Jack’ bears different semantic properties across non-
semantically duplicate worlds, and Semantic Supervenience fails.
Let us grant, for the sake of argument, the (not entirely innocent or uncontroversial)
assumption that expressions referring to haecceitistically distinct cross-world indiscernibles
are semantically discernible. Therefore, let us grant that the proposed scenario does entail a
genuine difference between the reference  of ‘Jack’  in  W@ and the reference of ‘Jack’ in
WTwin.  The  success  of  the  experiment,  then,  hinges  on  the  claim  that  the  haecceitistic
difference  between  Jack  and  Twin  Jack  does  not  invalidate  the  complete  non-semantic
indiscernibility  between  W@ and  WTwin needed  to  generate  a  genuine  counterexample  to
Semantic  Supervenience.  The problem here is  the principled feasibility  of any attempt to
argue that differences in the haecceitistic properties instantiated by two worlds do not entail
lack of identity among their distributions of non-semantic properties. Logical space dictates
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that  any  claim  in  that  spirit  would  have  to  produce  proof  either  that  the  haecceitistic
difference between Jack and Twin Jack is semantic, or that it is neither semantic nor non-
semantic. Now, the haecceitistic difference between Jack and Twin Jack doesn’t seem to have
anything to do with meaning: if so, how to isolate it from the set of attributes that fix the
distribution of non-semantic properties of W@ and WTwin, provided that such a distribution is
understood to encompass, as we have stipulated,  every property which is not semantic in
nature?
As you might recall, K&M do propose a way to bypass the complication: the argument
that even if the haecceitistic difference between actual Jack and Twin Jack did set a locus of
non-semantic discernibility between W@ and WTwin, for the purposes of evaluating Semantic
Supervenience  this  non-semantic  difference  can  be  ignored,  since  few  would  take
haecceitistic facts to feature in the subvening base of semantic properties. I agree that most
advocates of Semantic Supervenience would exclude haecceitistic properties from the realm
of subvening factors that fix semantic properties, assuming they would allow haecceitism in
the first place. However, Haecceitistic Twins seems to have an opportunistic relationship with
this premise. On one hand, the experiment motivates talk of W@ and WTwin as non-semantic
duplicates by banning haecceitistic properties from the realm of non-semantic facts semantic
properties are sensitive to. On the other, the argument claims that ‘Jack’ differs in reference
across W@ and WTwin because of the haecceitistic difference between actual Jack and Twin
Jack. But if the haecceitistic difference between Jack and Twin Jack is the only ground of the
difference in reference between ‘Jack’ in W@ and ‘Jack’ in WTwin,  then that  difference  is
included in the set of facts that determine semantic properties, contrary to the declared reason
for taking the haecceitistic discernibility of Jack and Twin Jack to be non-semantically inert.
To put it bluntly: it is a bit odd to argue that W@ and WTwin can be considered non-semantic
duplicates because the average supporter of the supervenience thesis would take haecceitistic
differences to be semantically inconsequential, and then claim that an haecceitistic difference
alone can be responsible for a difference in reference. If the sole explanans for the difference
in  the  reference  of  ‘Jack’  across  W@ and  WTwin is  that  Jack  and  Twin  Jack  differ
haecceitistically, then haecceitistic differences are in fact assumed to have semantic import,
which undercuts the proposed motivation to regard WTwin as a genuine non-semantic duplicate
of W@.21 Absent that, Haecceitistic Twins poses no threat to Semantic Supervenience.
21 To be clear, there’s a weaker variant of Semantic Supervenience which would survive this specific objection:
the thesis that no two worlds w1 and w2 can have the same worldwide distribution of non-semantic, non-haec-
ceitistic properties, and fail to have the same worldwide distribution of semantic properties. However, this vari-
ant would face two issues. First, it would still be vulnerable to the rest of the observations raised earlier, as well
as to the positive arguments I’m about to describe. Second, it would be insufficiently ambitious under haec-
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5. Control, Identity, Knowledge
I  have  argued  that  Semantic  Supervenience  survives  K&M’s  “core”  anti-supervenience
scenarios.  In  this  Section,  I  will  move  my defense  of  Semantic  Supervenience  one  step
further,  and in a more constructive direction,  offering three counterarguments in favor of
Semantic  Supervenience:  an Argument from Control,  an Argument from Identity,  and an
Argument from Knowledge. The arguments follow a shared blueprint: they take a plausible
assumption, consider what would happen to it if we were to reject Semantic Supervenience,
and show that the rejection of the supervenience thesis would force us to give up the plausible
assumption, which in turn generates unwelcome consequences.
Let’s begin with the Argument from Control. It is widely believed that speakers enjoy
at least some degree of control over the semantic properties of their language. Depending on
the particular metasemantics one is assuming, such a control may be hard or relatively easy to
exercise.  For  example,  it  is  now  common  wisdom  that  strict  versions  of  metasemantic
externalism,  on  which  word  meanings  are  heavily  anchored  to  external  factors  such  as
naturalness,  magnetism,  dominant  sources,  and  causal  chains  of  historical  transmission
leading back to  origination  events  (e.g.,  Evans 1973;  Burge 1979;  Kripke  1980;  Putnam
1975, 1981), curtail speakers’ ability to intervene in an efficacious way on standing semantic
meaning (Cappelen 2018). Yet, even the most austere brands of metasemantic externalism
allow for cases in which speakers are able to engineer the standing meaning of an expression.
Suppose that  the  entire  population  of  speakers  of  English  gathers  together  in  a  meaning
change assembly, the Platybat Congress. After careful deliberation and a unanimous vote, the
participants  establish  that  ‘wombat’  should denote  platypuses,  and that  ‘platypus’  should
denote wombats. They update the lemmas of the two terms in official dictionaries, and start
to  use  them without  exception  in  this  revised  semantic  construal.  No  matter  your  prior
metasemantic persuasions, you should allow that at least in scenarios of this sort, featuring
cases of exceptionally tight agentive coordination, the population of speakers has managed to
effect actual top-down change in the semantic properties of ‘wombat’ and ‘platypus’.22 In
ceitism, since it  wouldn’t  adjudicate supervenience in a framework admitting qualitatively indistinguishable
possible worlds that differ in non-qualitative respects.
22 Equivalently, suppose we intend to intervene on the semantic properties of ‘water’ and, to do that, we time-
travel to the past and change the history of the word ‘water’; or that, with the same purpose in mind, the entire
population of speakers of English leaves Earth and settles on Twin Earth. In both cases, even Cappelen’s (2018)
Austerity Framework would grant that we have managed to effect change in the semantic properties of ‘water’.
In the event you don’t find the Platybat Congress case particularly convincing, feel free to restate the argument
using any of these two further scenarios. For more on the interplay of externalism and semantic intervention,
see, e.g., Koch (2021).
16
short, it seems safe to assume that a reasonable metaphysics of meaning should make room
for  a  (however  austere  and  practically  demanding)  class  of  processes  P  such  that,  by
implementing a process in P, speakers can exercise non-lucky, causally efficacious control
over the semantic properties of the expressions of their language.
Now suppose WPlatybat is a minimal duplicate of W@ where the Platybat Congress has
just taken place. Further, reject Semantic Supervenience. If Semantic Supervenience is false,
no two worlds instantiating the same worldwide distribution of non-semantic properties are
guaranteed  to  instantiate the  same  worldwide  distribution  of  semantic  properties.
Accordingly, no world duplicating the worldwide distribution of non-semantic properties of
WPlatybat is guaranteed to instantiate the same worldwide distribution of semantic properties as
WPlatybat.  This means that no world duplicating the worldwide distribution of non-semantic
properties of WPlatybat is guaranteed to be a world where ‘wombat’ denotes platypuses. But this
is  consequential:  if  no  world  duplicating  the  worldwide  distribution  of  non-semantic
properties of WPlatybat is guaranteed to be a world where ‘wombat’ denotes platypuses, how
can we be sure that it manages to denote platypuses in WPlatybat itself? Granted, that may well
be the case, but not necessarily because the collective deliberation of the speakers gathered in
the Platybat  Congress  entails  the  relevant  change in  meaning.  In  fact,  in  the heavens of
possibilia there are countless non-semantic replicas of WPlatybat where the Platybat Congress
takes place, and yet ‘wombat’ continues to refer to wombats.23 Variants of the point would
readily apply to cases involving metalinguistic negotiation, utterances of nonce words with a
salient meaning, or the coinage of new technical terms. In short, it seems that the rejection of
Semantic Supervenience is bound to jeopardize our initial assumption that it is possible for
speakers to exercise efficacious, reliable, non-lucky control over the semantic properties of
their language.24 This is a major downside; so we should accept Semantic Supervenience.
23 Objection. The existence of close possible worlds where the Platybat Congress occurs without causing any
actual change in semantic properties, doesn’t show we should be skeptical about its efficacy in WPlatybat, and
extend the resulting concerns to the actual  world. Perhaps WPlatybat and W@ feature the kind of nomological
properties that allow the Platybat Congress to produce the desired meaning change, and we shouldn’t be moved
by the existence of possible worlds lacking  this favorable nomological  terrain.  Reply. By definition, the non-
semantic  properties  instantiated  by  a  world  include  its  nomological  properties.  Ex hypothesi,  non-semantic
duplicates of WPlatybat have the same nomological properties as WPlatybat, which in turn is a non-semantic duplicate
of W@. It follows that if Semantic Supervenience is false, there are countless particle-by-particle duplicates of
W@ featuring  the same nomological  regularities  of  the actual  world,  where  the  occurrence  of  the  Platybat
Congress wouldn’t yield meaning change. So nomological considerations do not help contain the damage.
24 Emphasis  on “our  initial  assumption that”.  The point  isn’t  that  the  causally  inefficacy  counterfactually
licensed by the rejection of Semantic Supervenience entails that in W@ speakers have no control over semantic
properties. The point is that absent Semantic Supervenience, we can no longer be confident in our belief that our
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Next, the Argument from Identity (inspired by Stich and Laurence 1994). As was made
clear, for one class of properties, A, to fail to strong-globally supervene on another class of
properties,  B,  there  should  be  pairs  of  possible  worlds  instantiating  the  exact  same
distribution of B-properties while failing to instantiate the same distribution of A-properties.
On Semantic Supervenience, the base class of properties on which the semantic supervenes
encompasses the entire distribution of non-semantic properties of a world. Now take two
arbitrary worlds, w1 and w2, such that w1 and w2 instantiate the exact same set of non-semantic
properties. Ex hypothesi, w1 and w2 share, a.o., the same micro-physical properties, the same
haecceitistic properties, the same spatiotemporal location, the same metaphysical structure,
the same laws, the same  history, the same relational, functional, and behavioral properties.
But  there’s  no  way  two  worlds  can  have  the  same  micro-physical  properties,  the  same
haecceitistic properties, the same spatiotemporal location, the same metaphysical structure,
the same laws, the same history, the same relational, functional, and behavioral properties –
without being  identical.  If they are identical,  w1 and  w2 instantiate the same distribution of
properties  simpliciter.  But if they instantiate the same distribution of properties  simpliciter,
they also instantiate the same distribution of semantic properties. Hence, semantic properties
have to supervene.
One might  worry:  how isn’t  this  the same circular  nonchalance  I  was complaining
about  in  the  discussion  of  Semantic  Ghosts?  Isn’t  this  smuggling  the  truth  of  Semantic
Supervenience in the common ground instead of providing an argument for it? Not quite: it’s
being explicit about the extensional implications of perfect non-semantic indiscernibility, and
arguing that the weight of  such implications  pushes the ball  towards my opponent’s court.
For there are two possible ways to block the argument. The first is simply to insist that worlds
sharing, a.o., the same micro-physical properties, the same haecceitistic properties, the same
spatiotemporal location, the same metaphysical structure, the same laws, the same history, the
same relational, functional, and behavioral properties –  can nonetheless instantiate different
distributions of semantic properties. Which, to escape objections of circularity, would require
an  independent  argument  I  don’t  see on the  horizon.  The second is  to  insist  that  worlds
sharing, a.o., the same micro-physical properties, the same haecceitistic properties, the same
spatiotemporal location, the same metaphysical structure, the same laws, the same history, the
same relational, functional, and behavioral properties – are not guaranteed to be identical and,
e.g., perfectly equally close to other possible worlds. Which would shift the burden of proof
on  the  notion  of  “identity”  underlying  the  response,  and  on  whether  that  stands  to
independent scrutiny. Both options, as far as I can tell, face an uphill climb. Absent a more
world is one where that the brand of metasemantic control that matters to the argument is possible.
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specific and non-question-begging proof that it is metaphysically possible for complete non-
semantic indiscernibility to fail to entail full-blooded identity, the proposed line of reasoning
should, in fact, put an additional dialectical burden on the case against supervenience.
Finally, the Argument from Knowledge. As we have seen, part of K&M’s rationale is to
argue  that  Semantic  Supervenience  is  vulnerable  to  a  variant  of the  battery  of  classical
arguments  against  the  supervenience  of  the  phenomenal  on  the  physical.  Let’s  take  the
suggestion  to  heart.  Anti-physicalists  in  the  philosophy  of  mind  have  appealed  to  the
conceivability of phenomenal zombies to claim that phenomenal properties don’t supervene
on the physical. One prominent consideration in favor of the conceivability of zombies is,
famously,  the  intuition  that  omniscience  about  the  non-phenomenal  does  not  guarantee
phenomenal  knowledge  (Jackson  1982;  Chalmers  1996).  If  semantic  properties  didn’t
supervene on the non-semantic, we would then expect to be able to make a case for semantic
zombies via a semantic variant of the knowledge argument.
With that in mind, let WZenglish be a duplicate of W@ differing from W@ exclusively in
the following: in WZenglish, the vocabulary items of English are replaced by zombie replicas
without semantic properties. WZenglish is indiscernible from W@ physically, functionally and
behaviorally. Speakers of Zenglish behave exactly like speakers of actual English; they go
about their daily lives exactly like we do; they debate just like we do about whether or not
semantic properties are supervenient; and subscribe to the same metalinguistic statements we
believe true of W@. They say, e.g., that ‘triangle’ designates triangles, that ‘triangle’ is of type
<e, t>, that the sentence  “Triangles have three sides” is true by virtue of meaning, and so
forth. However, every true statement about the semantic properties of actual English is false
of Zenglish. Pace the intuitions of speakers of Zenglish, in WZenglish ’triangle’ doesn’t refer to
triangles; it isn’t of type <e, t>; “Triangles have three sides” is not true by virtue of meaning.
Is WZenglish conceivable? To have a semantic variant of the knowledge argument for the
conceivability of WZenglish, we should be able to elicit the intuition that omniscience about the
non-semantic does not warrant semantic knowledge: it should conceivably be impossible to
derive  knowledge  of  the  semantic  properties  of  an  actual  expression  of  English  from
omniscience about  the non-semantic  properties  of W@.  However,  this  seems problematic.
First, intuition suggests that an ideal rational agent with a complete grasp of the non-semantic
properties of W@ would be in a position to acquire knowledge of English semantics through
appropriate inference-making, much as it happens in regular instances of language learning.25
25 Think of language acquisition in children, and recall that, by definition, observable linguistic behavior – e.g.,
the articulation of specific patterns of speech sounds in specific contexts by a group of caregivers – belongs to
the realm of non-semantic facts.
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Second, denying ideal, non-semantically omniscient agents that ability, would have crippling
consequences  on  our  own  ability  to  claim  a reliable  epistemic  access  to  actual  semantic
properties.
The reasoning is as follows. Assume that complete knowledge of the distribution of
non-semantic properties of a world w and ideal reasoning powers entail an ability to know the
semantic properties of  w. Call  this, for brevity,  the Access Rule. By the Access Rule, an
inferentially  omnipotent  being with a perfect  grasp of the worldwide distribution of non-
semantic properties of W@, would  ipso facto have knowledge, or be in a position to gain
knowledge, of the semantic properties of English. Also by the Access Rule, an inferentially
omnipotent  being  with  a  perfect  grasp  of  the  worldwide  distribution  of  non-semantic
properties  of  WZenglish would  ipso  facto have  knowledge  (or  be  in  a  position  to  gain
knowledge) of the semantic properties of Zenglish. However,  ex hypothesi, W@  and WZenglish
are  indiscernible  in  everything  that  doesn’t  pertain  the  distinction  between  English  and
Zenglish. But then, our inferentially omnipotent being with a perfect grasp of the worldwide
distribution  of  non-semantic  properties  should  be  able  to  derive two  radically  different
conclusions (the semantic facts of W@ and WZenglish) from the exact same set of premises (the
non-semantic facts of W@  and WZenglish).  Which means that our  non-semantically omniscient
being will be semantically ignorant in at least one of the two worlds. In other words, we agree
that knowledge of semantic properties can be reliably acquired by rational inference-making
based  on  the  non-semantic  properties  of  a  world.  However,  it  turns  out  that  rejecting
Semantic  Supervenience  prevents that,  since it  no longer  allows the combination  of  non-
semantic omniscience and ideal reasoning powers to rule out the risk of semantic ignorance.
If the combination of non-semantic omniscience and ideal reasoning powers does not entail
the ability  to acquire semantic knowledge, how do we  secure ordinary speakers’ epistemic
access to semantic knowledge in the actual world itself, provided semantic nativism is false
and  ordinary  speakers  acquire  semantic  knowledge  through  the  observation  of  the  non-
semantic? Or how do we rule out that the English we all use isn’t Zenglish, since after all W@
is by definition a perfect non-semantic duplicate of WZenglish?26
To sum up: without Semantic Supervenience the Access Rule produces inconsistent
results; in the absence of something doing the job of the Access Rule, semantic properties are
26 For the record, none of this has the backward implication that we have no way of making sure that we’re
phenomenal zombies, or no way of grasping the phenomenal properties instantiated by our current experiential
states. As far as phenomenal properties are concerned, we can dodge the skeptical bullet I’m firing at WZenglish
by acknowledging  via non-conceptual  introspective means that we’re occurrently having an experience with
such and such “raw” phenomenal characteristics.  See, e.g.,  Giustina (2019).  Of course,  the reasoning holds
provided you’re not an illusionist à la Frankish (2016), but that’s another matter altogether.
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no longer guaranteed to be knowable via the observation of the non-semantic; which in turn
puts speakers and semantic theories  in the actual world  under the threat of a massive error
theory about the semantic properties actually instantiated in W@. Put the pieces together, and
the emerging conclusion is that the rejection of Semantic Supervenience paves the way for a
radical  form of skepticism about our ability  to reliably  track the distribution of semantic
properties instantiated at the actual world. This is a deeply undesirable result.27 So we’d better
believe in Semantic Supervenience.
6. Conclusion
This paper has proceeded as follows. Section 1 introduced the thesis of the supervenience of
the  semantic  on  the  non-semantic,  and  set  the  roadmap  of  the  paper.  Section  2  defined
Semantic Supervenience as the  claim that no two  possible worlds can instantiate the same
worldwide distribution of non-semantic properties, and fail to instantiate the same worldwide
distribution of semantic  properties.  Section 3 described the three counterexamples fueling
K&M’s  “core”  case  against  Semantic  Supervenience:  Semantic  Ghosts,  Magic,  and
Haecceitistic Twins. Section 4 argued that K&M’s counterexamples don’t hold up. Section 5
presented three counterarguments for Semantic Supervenience: an  Argument from Control,
an Argument from Identity, and an Argument from Knowledge.
I have argued that Semantic Supervenience isn’t vulnerable to a semantic variant of the
classical arguments against the supervenience of the phenomenal on the physical, and made
my case that the rejection of Semantic Supervenience generates unwelcome consequences.
Though often assumed without explicit  argument, there are substantial reasons to believe in
the received wisdom: semantic properties supervene.
27 In and of itself and dialectically, for it runs counter the stipulation introduced in Section 2 with noting that if
semantic properties were not knowable or we were at risk of being massively mistaken about them (or to be
merely luckily correct about them), we wouldn’t be in a position to make reliable judgments about the semantic
properties instantiated at any given world, which would undermine the very enterprise of determining whether
Semantic Supervenience stands to scrutiny.
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